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THE GLOBAL TRADE ARCHITECTURE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Martin Khor and José Antonio Ocampo* 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in April 1994 by the 
Marrakesh Agreement, which concluded eight years of negotiations of the Uruguay 
Round. Since then, the WTO has been widely taken to be the embodiment of the 
multilateral trading system. In fact the WTO is only a part (though of course, a very 
significant part) of the global trade architecture. There are also other institutions 
(especially the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD) and 
other agreements (in particular the regional and bilateral trade agreements) that are part 
of the trade architecture. Although the WTO covers many trade issues, it does not cover 
some crucial trade areas such as the issue of commodities and their related problems of 
instability of prices and demand, an issue that has been traditionally covered by 
UNCTAD and was subject in the past to a series of commodity agreements.  Moreover, 
the mandate of the WTO also covers non-trade subjects such as intellectual property 
rights and the investment component of services. Thus, it is interesting to note that the 
WTO is less than the multilateral trade system, and also more than it. 
The parts of the international trade architecture that come under the WTO are 
covered by the organization’s principles and legally binding rules, as well as a strong 
enforcement mechanism through its dispute settlement system. The preamble to the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO does contain the objective that “trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand (…) in accordance with the objective of sustainable development”. It 
equally recognizes the need for positive efforts to “ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth of international 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development”. The preamble also 
states the desire of “contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and 
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the information upon which it is based has not been updated. 
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mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the eliminations of discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations”. The principle of “non-discrimination” –based, in turn, on Most-Favored 
Nation (MFN) and “national treatment” (that imported goods must not be accorded 
treatment less favorable than that accorded to like domestic products)—together with the 
principle of Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries (SDT), 
constitute two pillars of the architecture of rules upon which the multilateral trading 
system is supposed to be built up. 
It can be argued that the main stated objectives of the WTO are therefore those of 
raising living standards, full employment and growth of real income, as well as ensuring 
that developing countries secure a fair share in global trade growth, whilst reduction of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and elimination of discriminatory treatment are instruments 
to achieve them. However, in practice, the means have many times prevailed over the 
ends and, in particular, insufficient attention has been given to the “development 
dimensions” of the global trading system, in particular on what trading rules and 
complementary policies are necessary to maximize the trade-development link. 
The principle of SDT –that is, asymmetrical treatment or non-reciprocity in 
international trading rules when they involve transactions between developed and 
developing countries—was adopted in the 1960s to underscore the trade-development 
link and, in this sense, to complement the principle of non-discrimination on which 
GATT had been built since the late 1940s. It is a major exception to the principle of non-
discrimination, to allow for unequal treatment of unequal partners.1 However, as we will 
see, SDT has been at best highly insufficient and at worst openly violated. This is even 
more clearly valid of the free trade agreements that have proliferated in recent years, 
which have also ended up radically eroding the principle of non-discrimination. 
This paper looks at the major aspects of the trading system and its relations to 
development. It is divided in six parts. The first summarizes the process and outcome of 
                                                 
1 See, on this, Das (2003). 
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the Uruguay Round of negotiations that created WTO. The second considers the WTO 
agenda from the point of view of development. The third analyzes more specifically the 
proposals on market access that have surrounded the current Doha round. The fourth 
takes a look at decision making in WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism. The fifth 
analyzes the proliferation of free trade agreements over recent decades. The sixth draws 
some brief conclusions. 
I. The background and balance of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
1. The international trading system in the run up to the Uruguay Round 
 The reconstruction of international trade after was one of the major successes of 
the post-Second World War era.2 Although the Havana Charter that had proposed the 
creation of the International Trade Organization, one of the major pillars of the 
envisioned post-war institutional order, was not ratified by US Congress, the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been agreed beforehand as part of 
the future ITO, became the framework for trade liberalization among Western industrial 
countries. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle made its comeback after the 
collapse of multilateralism and the rise of managed and highly discriminatory trade in the 
1930s. Industrial country tariffs for industrial products came down significantly through 
seven rounds of GATT negotiations. Interestingly, the growth of trade in the 1950s and 
1960s largely concentrated in manufacturing trade within two European blocks –Western 
and Eastern Europe—, which in the first case included a major exception of the most 
favored nation principle (an integration agreement adopted in the context of GATT 
Article XXIV) and in latter full fledged managed trade. 
 Given their traditional specialization in primary rather than manufacturing 
exports, developing countries were largely marginalized from the initial reconstruction of 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of major trends in trade both in the 1930s and in the post-war years, see Findlay and 
O’Rourke (2007), chapters 8 and 9. See also Ocampo and Martin (2003), chapter 2, about the historical 
links between trade and growth, and Akyüz (2003) and Ocampo and Vos (2008), chapter III, for more 
recent trends. 
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international trade. Under the axis of state-led industrialization strategies3 and the 
strengthened nationalism that characterized the decolonization process, their trade 
policies focused on the domestic markets and heavy state intervention, and thus ran in the 
opposite direction to the gradual trade liberalization that took place among Western 
industrial countries. The rise of an export-oriented strategy in East Asia in the 1960s 
represented the most significant change in this regard. It shared, however, with traditional 
inward-looking state-led industrialization both significant state intervention and high 
levels of protection, now mixed with export subsidies. Several Latin American countries 
also started to mix export promotion strategies with import protection, visualizing these 
policy instruments as complements rather than substitutes.4 By the 1970s the rise of 
manufacturing exports from some Asian and Latin American countries had become a new 
feature of world trade. 
  The marginalization of developing countries from international trade had given 
rise to concerns about the structure of the international trading system. Under the 
leadership of the recently created United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the new principle Special and Differential Treatment for developing 
countries was born in the 1960s. This principle led to the drafting of Part IV of GATT, on 
trade and development, and the more comprehensive “Enabling Clause” approved in 
1979 during the Tokyo Round. Article XXXVI provided a clear formulation of the 
principle of special and differential treatment: “The developed contracting parties do not 
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.” (…). 
The understanding of the meaning of this principle was clarified soon after and written 
into the fifth provision of the Enabling Clause: “Developed contracting parties shall 
                                                 
3 This concept, proposed by Cardenas et al. (2000) is much better to describe industrialization policies than 
the usual concept of “import substitution industrialization”, which emphasizes one of the specific 
dimensions of the process, and not necessarily the most important one. 
4 The idea that protection and exports promotion can be complements can be defended when there are 
under-utilized resources and/or when the domestic market can be used to generate static or dynamic 
economies of scale that allow a country to become competitive in a set of goods and services. The latter 
was formalized by Krugman (1990, chapter 12) as the argument for “import protection as export 
promotion”. In contrast, the traditional neo-classical argument of protection as an “anti-export bias”, to 
which we refer below, is based on the assumptions of full employment and absence of scale economies. 
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therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, 
concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs.” 
 The main development of this principle was the creation of the General System of 
Preferences (GSP) in 1968 and its implementation by major industrial countries since the 
early 1970s, based on the waiver to the MFN principle for the Generalized System of 
Preferences approved in 1971. However, GSP never became what it was expected to be, a 
generalized (as its name indicates) system of preferences subject to multilateral 
notification. Several studies soon indicated that its effects were rather frustrating.5 
Perhaps more importantly, SDT was reflected up to the Uruguay Round in the fact 
that those developing countries that were GATT members kept most of the tariffs 
unbound, made an extensive use of quantitative import restrictions (QRs) and other 
mechanisms of trade intervention (such as the rules on domestic contents in assembly 
operations and export targeting commitments for foreign firms that were baptized during 
the Uruguay Round as “Trade-Related Investment Measures”, TRIMS). Only a few of 
them signed the codes of conduct on subsidies, import licenses and others approved 
during the Tokyo Round (see Table 1). On intellectual property, which was in any case 
considered to be outside the domain of the trade system, the developing countries had 
wide flexibility to adopt their own national approaches. 
Trends in policy in both developed and developing countries experienced 
significant changes in the 1970s and, particularly, in the 1980s. In the case of industrial 
countries, exceptions to trade liberalization and multilateral rules had been taking place 
for some time in “sensitive” sectors. Since the mid-1950s, under pressure from the US 
but also of the European Economic Community, agriculture had been accepted as a major 
exception to GATT’s principles and rules of gradual trade liberalization, non-
subsidization and exceptional use of QRs. Since the latter part of the 1950s, industrial 
countries also began to use import quotas to protect themselves against textile imports, 
                                                 
5 Thus, for example, Karensky and Laird (1987) showed that in 1983 the GSP had increased developing 
country exports by only 2%, with half of those benefits going to the Asian Tigers and Brazil. See also 
Whalley (1990). 
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one of the most dynamic manufacturing exports form developing countries. Whereas 
textiles were explicitly excluded from the agendas of both the Kennedy (1963-1967) and 
Tokyo (1973-1979) Rounds, the attempt to bring agriculture to both Rounds ended up in 
major deadlocks on both occasions. 
Table 1
                                           Scope of Tariff Bindings and Coverage of Tokyo Round Codes
Developed     Developing Countries
Countries Total Africa America Asia Europe
GATT Membership
  (December 1990) 23 77 33 21 16 7
Percentage of import bound 95% 21% 31% 46% 10% 55%
Signatories of Tokyo Round Codes
  Technical Barriers 21 18 3 4 7 4
  Government procurement 20 3 0 0 3 0
  Subsidies 22 14 1 4 8 1
  Customs valuation 22 15 4 3 4 4
  Import licences 22 17 4 3 5 5
  Anti-dumping 22 13 1 2 5 5
Source: Ocampo (1992), Table 2  
  The growing use of selective forms of protectionism in the late 1970s and 1980s 
–Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and Orderly Market Agreements (OMAs)—also 
implied an extensive use of QRs and a violation to the principle of non-discrimination. 
They were generally aimed at Japan but also at exports from successful developing 
country manufacturing exporters. As they were adopted outside the framework for 
safeguards provided by GATT, they came to be known as “gray area” measures. In turn, 
the provisions of GATT for contingency protection –antidumping and countervailing 
duties— were increasingly used in 1970s and 1980s with what was perceived to be a 
protectionist bias.  
 These trends were part of a broader weakening of the commitment to gradual 
trade liberalization and multilateralism by Western industrial countries. In the case of the 
US, a factor that aggravated protectionist trends was the sharp appreciation of the US 
dollar in the first half of the 1980s. This reflected a significant paradox of the 
international order in recent decades, which may be seen as a major contradiction 
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between the dominant views of trade and exchange rate policies. Whereas in the 
European Community (later Union), exchange rate stability was seen as a sine-qua-non 
of growing market integration, no similar commitment was adopted at the global level. 
Rather, the principle of flexible exchange rates among major countries and, more 
broadly, the autonomy of countries to adopt any exchange rate regime they found best 
suited to their conditions, was firmly established after the collapse of the original Bretton 
Woods arrangements in the early 1970s. This is paradoxical because exchange rate 
fluctuations can generate stronger effects on import prices than industrial country tariff 
levels, and greater incentives to export than export subsidies. 
 Growing protectionism was one of the major reasons why developing countries 
came to increasingly distrust the commitment of industrial countries to a more liberal 
multilateral trading order. Major reasons were the exclusion of agriculture from the 
normal multilateral  trade rules and formulation of special ad hoc restrictive arrangement 
for textiles, the high tariffs and extensive use of QRs that characterized those sectors, and 
tariff escalation according to the processing of raw materials, which generated constraints 
to industrialization based on forward linkages of traditional raw material exports. This 
implied that, in sharp contrast to the acceptance of the principle of SDT in the 1960s, 
industrial countries tended to discriminate against potential exports from developing 
countries. 
 From the perspective of industrialized countries, rising exports from some rapidly 
industrializing developing countries were increasingly seen as a growing threat. For 
them, the lack of graduation rules from SDT implied that rapidly industrializing 
developing countries were in fact free riding on the benefits of a multilateral trading 
order. Given that industrial countries perceived technological innovation to be one of 
their sources of comparative advantage, the lack of strict intellectual property rights 
protection in some developing countries was seen as a major threat. They also saw some 
services as areas of comparative advantage, and thus the need to extend trade disciplines 
in that direction. These perceptions became the basis for use by the United States of the 
301 provisions of the 1984 and 1988 Trade Acts to press some Latin American and Asian 
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countries to dismantle export subsidies and adopt intellectual property regimes more 
similar to those of the US. They also pressed them to offer significant tariff and non-tariff 
concessions as a condition to enter GATT. 
 There was also a change of perception in the development debates about the 
virtues of state-led industrialization vs. export-led growth. In the orthodox interpretation 
that gradually gained ground, protection was increasingly viewed not only as leading to 
inefficient allocation of resources but also as a source of “anti-export biases” that blocked 
the opportunities for export-led growth. This interpretation was fully articulated by 
Krueger (1978) and became the official World Bank doctrine in the 1980s. This implied a 
view of protection and export promotion as alternative rather than complementary 
strategies, and was based on a biased interpretation of East Asian success with export-led 
growth, which emphasized “neutral incentives” rather than state intervention This ran in 
sharp contrast the interpretations by Amsden (2001), Chang (2002) and Wade (2003) of 
such success, among others, for whom state intervention was a crucial ingredient. The 
World Bank (1993) tried, rather unsuccessfully, to draw an eclectic view of the East 
Asian success, based on a mix of both stories. The debt crisis faced by many countries in 
Latin America and Africa provided the leverage of the World Bank to diffuse and even 
impose its views through policy conditionality in structural adjustment programs. 
Those developing countries that relied on export-led growth now also had a 
growing interest in a better multilateral trading order per se while t industrial countries 
increasingly saw them as competitors, and were thus reluctant to grant them special and 
differential treatment. Rather, in a sharp reversal of the principle of asymmetric treatment 
for developing countries, they called for a “level playing field” in international trade. 
2. The outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
 This is the complex background to the debates that surrounded the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. In the 1982 Ministerial meeting and in 1986, in Punta del Este, 
where the Round was launched, the consensus was to put most of these issues –and 
associated grievances— on the agenda. Several developing countries strongly resisted the 
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inclusion of services and, even more, of intellectual property in the negotiations, as they 
felt this would detract from the backlog issues in the trade of goods –particularly 
agriculture, textiles and tariff escalation—, the elimination of the “gray areas”, and the 
additional discipline required for the use of mechanisms of contingency protection. 
However, the inclusion of the new topics demanded by industrial countries seemed to be 
the price that developing countries were asked to pay, in exchange for developed 
countries agreeing to negotiate the issues of interest to the developing world. 
In the context of the fact that the Round agreement would eventually be adopted as “a 
single undertaking”, and that developing countries had few prior disciplines in the 
context of GATT, the acceptance of a comprehensive agenda was likely to lead to 
significant additional commitments for them. Most early evaluations of the Round 
(Agosin et al., 1995; Ocampo, 1992; Rodrik, 1995) came indeed to the conclusion that 
the Round had led to a sharp increase in the range of obligations and responsibilities 
adopted by developing countries and a loss of what came to be later called the “policy 
space” they had enjoyed in the past, including to adopt the aggressive East Asian export-
led strategies that had been widely praised in previous decades. The SDT principle was 
significantly eroded, particularly for middle-income developing countries. In these cases, 
SDT was confined to longer transition periods, lower tariff cuts, and somewhat greater 
freedom to apply special provisions (e.g., in relation to subsidies). In contrast, the 
additional responsibilities adopted by industrial countries were limited, and they were left 
with significant room to continue using their traditional instruments of state intervention. 
A basic feature of the disciplines introduced by the Uruguay Round was the 
adoption of a strong dispute settlement mechanism, perhaps the strongest of its kind in 
the current multilateral order. The old GATT mechanism allowed rulings that could be 
ignored by affected countries (in fact, affected countries could veto the decision, a 
practice which was, in any case, generally avoided). In the new WTO rules, panel rulings 
could not be vetoed and were only subject to an appellate body, the decisions of which 
were binding. However, some important problems remained in this area, associated with 
the high costs of using the mechanism and the asymmetric power of potential retaliation 
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by different countries. The system also included the possibility of “cross-sectoral 
retaliation”, which potentially made the effects of non-compliance more painful. For 
example, if a developing country did not comply with its obligations in the TRIPS 
agreement, a complaining party that succeeds in a dispute could retaliate through actions 
in the area of trade in goods. 
Gains for developing countries included the prohibition of gray area measures as 
well as the dismantling of the Multi-Fiber Agreement, though with a long transition (ten 
years, the longest transition agreed) that also allowed affected countries to postpone until 
the very end the lifting of their most restrictive policies on textile imports. There were 
also increased disciplines in the use of the instruments of contingency protection. 
Industrial country tariffs for industrial goods were further reduced, though from already 
low levels and maintaining the tariff peaks and escalation that had been criticized by 
developing countries since the 1960s (Table 2). 
                                                  Table 2
                             Major characteristics of tariff regimes
Pre-UR Post-UR
A. Percentage of tariff lines bound
    Developed countries 78 99
    Developing countries 22 72
B. Percentage of imports under bound rates
    Developed countries 94 99
    Developing countries 14 59
C. Import-weighted tariff rates Applied Bound
    Developed countries 4.0 4.7
    Developing countries 13.1 20.8
         Latin America and the Caribbean 10.1 18.6
         East Asia and the Pacific 9.8 16.6
         South Asia 27.7 56.1
         Europe and Central Asia 9.6 14.9
         Middle East and North Africa 14.4 26.8
         Sub-Saharan Africa 16.5 19.8
D. Bound rates of industrial countries
    (all industrial products, excluding petroleum) 4.3
    Raw material 0.8
    Semi-manufactures 2.8
    Finished products 6.2
      Natural-resource based 5.9
      Textiles and clothing 11.0
Sources: A and B: Rodrik (1995), Table 4.
              C and D: Laird (2002), Tables 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3  
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In the case of agriculture, negotiations had, in contrast, a deeply frustrating 
outcome. The only breakthrough was the formal inclusion of the issue in WTO, as the 
agreement allowed a large number of subsidies to be maintained, even on a permanent 
basis (what came to be known as the “Green” and “Blue Boxes”), whereas commitments 
on the reduction of restricted subsidies (export subsidies and domestic subsidies that are  
classified under the “Amber Box”) did not represent an improvement over what 
countries, particularly European countries, had already done on an unilateral basis. 
Indeed, as the estimates by the World Bank (2008, Figure 4.3) for the post-war period 
now make clear, the reference period adopted was that with highest proportional level of 
agricultural subsidies in the industrial countries. Indeed, deep frustration by many actors 
with this outcome, led to the only other meaningful decision that was adopted together 
with the inclusion of agriculture in WTO: that the agricultural agreement would have to 
be renegotiated after five years (in the year 2000). 
The counterpart of these advances was a significant set of new commitments by 
developing countries, which are further analyzed below. Most stringent, according to all 
evaluations, were the new disciplines in intellectual property rights, which generated a 
constraint that had not been present in prior development experiences, including those of 
industrial countries. QRs were forbidden, except as emergency measures during balance 
of payments crises (under stricter disciplines, in any case) and tariff bindings increased 
substantially, indeed to cover the whole tariff schedule for many middle-income 
countries. Another instrument that had been actively used by developing countries in the 
past, both as a protection devise and as an export promotion instrument, the so-called 
TRIMS, was prohibited. Nonetheless, many developing countries were able to keep 
bound tariffs at levels that were substantially higher that those effectively applied after 
their own unilateral liberalization processes.  
Some of the greatest contrasts between the degrees of additional commitments 
made by industrial vs. developing countries lay in the area of subsidies. In practice, the 
major subsidy instrument used by developing countries, export subsidies, was prohibited 
for countries with a per capita GDP above $1000, except in the case of agriculture, where 
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industrial countries staunchly defended their traditional forms of state intervention. This 
exception was part of a broader acceptance at Marrakesh of all major instruments of 
intervention used by industrial countries, with some restrictions. This included export and 
production subsidies in agriculture, but also technological, regional and horizontal 
subsidies in the general agreement on subsidies. This asymmetry was also present in the 
case of QRs, which were generally prohibited and made more stringent in the case of 
balance of payments crises, the typical clause used by developing countries, but were 
given greater room in textiles (during the transition period), in the general safeguards 
agreement and, as we have seen, de facto in the case of agriculture. Both in relation to 
subsidies and QRs, as well as in the transitional provisions for textiles, the principle of 
special and differential treatment was not only ignored: it was actually turned upside 
down. 
Many developing countries initially fought against the inclusion of services in the 
Uruguay Round, arguing that the principles and rules applying to trade in goods are not 
necessarily appropriate for trade in services, and moreover there was a strong 
“investment” (as contrasted to trade) component in services. The services negotiations 
was conducted through most of the Round on a separate track with no prior agreement 
that it would merge with the negotiating track on trade in goods, but ultimately this 
merging of tracks took place. In the negotiations, the developing countries attempted to 
soften the new obligations on them by establishing a number of development principles 
and safeguards. 
The new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represented basically a 
framework for future negotiations. It included the basic principles of GATT –gradual 
trade liberalization, reciprocity, MFN— and added new ones –the transparency of 
domestic regulations and the need to negotiate commercial presence. However, in 
practice, countries maintained significant discretion as to what to liberalize (or even 
totally exclude certain sectors or activities from liberalization) and what form (or 
“mode”, according to GATS terminology) it would take. They also maintained a 
 14
significant degree of freedom to regulate the sector, including establishing restrictions on 
maximum foreign ownership of firms in specific activities. 
The sense that the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations had been 
imbalanced weighted heavily in the succeeding history of WTO. Whether a new “Round” 
was the best way to correct these imbalances is, of course, quite controversial. In this 
regard, it is important to recall that the possibility of conducting regular negotiations in 
WTO rather than through the sequence of special rounds used by GATT has been 
regarded as one of the major institutional innovations of the Marrakesh Agreement. For 
the purpose of correcting imbalances, a new round of negotiations was not the best 
alternative, as it brought with it the emphasis on reciprocity vis-à-vis developing 
countries. However, rather than negotiate first the pending issues (the so-called “built-in 
agenda”), particularly agriculture, European countries also advocated the idea of a new 
comprehensive deal to manage concessions in agriculture, rather than negotiate this issue 
by itself, as it had been agreed in Marrakesh. It was evident that they wanted to be “paid” 
by other countries for undertaking the agriculture commitments that they were already 
obliged to do. The consequence of all this is that, rather than correcting the imbalances, 
reciprocity ended up dominating the Doha Round negotiations. 
II. WTO’s Rules and the Problems faced by Developing Countries  
The scope of the WTO covers three main areas: trade in goods, services, and 
intellectual property. Rules for these are established respectively in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994, which incorporated GATT 1947 and its 
revisions, including Part IV on trade and development), the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). The GATT and TRIPS agreements contain the two dimensions 
of non-discrimination –i.e. most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment—, whilst 
GATS follows the MFN principle but allows significant departures from national 
treatment. 
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WTO rules on goods provide a framework within which member countries 
conduct trade. This has contributed to a measure of stability and predictability as 
contrasted to an alternative scenario in which arrangements are dominated by unilateral 
policies and bilateral arrangements. In this context, developing countries have been able 
to gain a rising share in world trade: from under a fourth of world exports when WTO 
was created to over a third today (Table 3). However, this process had started before the 
creation of WTO and been largely uneven across countries.6 China is responsible for 
most of the rising share of developing countries in world trade since 1995, particularly 
in low and high-tech manufactures, with the rest of developing countries increasing their 
share in world exports by only about one percentage point. Some regions, and 
particularly least developed countries, have continued to lose shares in world trade. 
             Furthermore, since the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries have 
complained that the benefits they anticipated have not materialized. The expansion of 
the agenda under the Uruguay Round, through the introduction of the then new issues, 
made the system even more imbalanced, as well as constraining of the domestic policy 
space –as the system moved from its traditional concern with trade barriers at the border, 
to issues involving domestic economic and development strategies and policies. 
Moreover, developing countries have faced multiple problems when they implement 
their own obligations.  
Also, the developing countries have come under pressure to negotiate the 
introduction of still new agreements or rules in the WTO, firstly on labor standards and 
secondly on the “Singapore issues”. The latter is a set of issues (investment, competition 
policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation) that the 
developed countries introduced at the WTO’s first Ministerial meeting held in Singapore 
in 1996. If accepted as the subject of new rules, these issues would have greatly 
expanded the mandate of the WTO. Since 1996, there has been a zig-zag course of these 
issues through the WTO’s negotiating process (see below). 
                                                 
6 See also, in this regard, Lall (2001), chapter 4, Akyüz (2003), chapter I, and Ocampo and Vos (2008), 
chapter III. 
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    Table 3
                                          Share of developing countries in world exports
1962 1980 1995 2006
A. China
    Primary commodities 1.1% 1.5% 3.1% 4.7%
    Natural resource based manufactures 0.4% 0.7% 2.3% 5.9%
    Low Tech manufactures 0.9% 2.4% 15.5% 32.3%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.3% 2.7% 9.6%
    High Tech manufactures 0.0% 0.2% 3.6% 22.0%
    Total 0.5% 0.9% 5.2% 15.8%
B. NICs w/out Taiwan
    Primary commodities 0.9% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5%
    Natural resource based manufactures 0.6% 1.6% 2.3% 3.2%
    Low Tech manufactures 3.1% 8.7% 6.9% 4.0%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.3% 1.8% 4.3% 5.2%
    High Tech manufactures 0.4% 3.5% 11.2% 10.5%
    Total 1.0% 3.0% 5.6% 5.7%
C. South East Asia
    Primary commodities 6.8% 5.8% 5.8% 4.8%
    Natural resource based manufactures 4.0% 4.9% 5.3% 5.6%
    Low Tech manufactures 0.3% 1.1% 5.1% 3.6%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.3% 2.0% 2.4%
    High Tech manufactures 0.1% 1.9% 6.9% 7.2%
    Total 2.8% 2.5% 4.5% 4.5%
D. Latin America and the Caribbean
    Primary commodities 16.5% 13.1% 12.8% 16.7%
    Natural resource based manufactures 7.3% 8.0% 5.9% 8.2%
    Low Tech manufactures 0.6% 2.5% 3.9% 3.6%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.3% 1.4% 3.5% 4.4%
    High Tech manufactures 0.4% 2.0% 1.9% 2.8%
    Total 6.3% 5.0% 4.6% 5.4%
E. Turkey and South Africa
    Primary commodities 3.2% 2.7% 2.1% 5.0%
    Natural resource based manufactures 1.9% 1.6% 1.3% 1.4%
    Low Tech manufactures 0.2% 0.6% 1.6% 1.8%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%
    High Tech manufactures 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
    Total 1.4% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2%
F. Middle East and North Africa
    Primary commodities 3.0% 2.4% 2.1% 1.7%
    Natural resource based manufactures 2.7% 1.5% 2.0% 2.3%
    Low Tech manufactures 0.8% 1.5% 1.7% 1.2%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.2% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
    High Tech manufactures 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6%
    Total 1.6% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2%
G. South Asia
    Primary commodities 3.9% 1.6% 1.8% 2.1%
    Natural resource based manufactures 1.8% 0.7% 1.4% 3.4%
    Low Tech manufactures 3.8% 1.9% 3.2% 2.5%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5%
    High Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
    Total 2.1% 0.8% 1.1% 1.3%
H. Sub Saharan Africa and other LDCs 1/
    Primary commodities 8.6% 4.8% 3.0% 1.7%
    Natural resource based manufactures 3.4% 1.9% 1.2% 0.5%
    Low Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1%
    Medium Tech manufactures 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
    High Tech manufactures 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%
    Total 3.2% 1.3% 0.6% 0.2%
I. Developing countries total
    Primary commodities 44.0% 33.1% 32.0% 38.2%
    Natural resource based manufactures 22.0% 20.9% 21.7% 30.4%
    Low Tech manufactures 9.9% 19.0% 38.3% 49.1%
    Medium Tech manufactures 1.4% 4.9% 14.2% 23.8%
    High Tech manufactures 1.3% 8.8% 24.5% 43.5%
    Total 19.0% 15.8% 23.7% 35.4%
1/ Excludes Bangladesh, which is included in South Asia
Source: Author's calculations based on UN-COMTRADE data.  
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Finally, as we will see in part IV, although WTO governance has certain 
advantages, particularly its formal democratic structure and its dispute settlement 
mechanism, its decision-making process has not been transparent and has not allowed in 
practice the full participation of developing countries. This was especially so in the 
earlier years of the WTO, during which the major developed countries were able to 
make the main decisions and the developing countries complained strongly at the 
manipulative methods employed, especially during Ministerial conferences. In recent 
years, developing countries have made greater inroads. However,  the decision-making 
process is still generally dominated by major developed countries, with only a few 
developing countries being admitted into the innermost circle. 
1. Imbalances in WTO Rules  
The imbalances in WTO rules relate both to the non-realization of anticipated 
benefits, and to the problems faced by developing countries in implementing their own 
obligations. 
On the first set of imbalances, developing countries had expected to benefit 
significantly from the Uruguay Round through increased access to the markets of 
developed countries for products. This was especially in agriculture and textiles, sectors 
in which developing countries have a comparative advantage. However, as Tables 2 and 
4 indicate, these two sectors remained those subject to the highest levels of protection in 
industrial countries. Tariff peaks continued to be an embedded feature of the system, 
particularly in these two sectors, and continued to affect in particular developing country 
exports. About three-fifths of total imports into industrial economies with tariffs that 
exceed 15% (which represent slightly less than 8% of these countries’ tariff schedules) 
came from developing countries (Olarreaga and Ng, 2002). Natural-resource intensive 
manufactures have also continued to be constrained by tariff escalation (Table 2). Non-
tariff barriers, particularly antidumping rules and technical standards have also continued 
to constrain exports from developing countries. 
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      Table 4
                         Major characteristics of applied protection, 2006
Total trade Agriculture Manufacturing
A. Tariffs
     High-Income Countries 2.1 12.1 1.4
     East Asia and Pacific 5.0 8.7 4.8
     Europe and Central Asia 4.5 10.3 4.0
     Latin America and the Caribbean 5.4 6.6 5.3
     Middle East and North Africa 11.9 12.1 11.8
     South Asia 14.0 31.4 13.2
     Sub-Saharan Africa 8.4 13.8 7.6
B. Overall trade restrictiveness
     High-Income Countries 7.0 43.1 4.3
     East Asia and Pacific 11.3 28.6 10.4
     Europe and Central Asia 10.1 25.9 9.0
     Latin America and the Caribbean 15.0 28.1 13.8
     Middle East and North Africa 21.6 32.3 19.4
     South Asia 19.5 46.4 18.2
     Sub-Saharan Africa 14.4 24.9 12.9
Source: Global Monitoring Report 2008, Tables 4.1 and 4.2  
In textiles, developing countries had for decades made a major concession by 
agreeing that their textiles and clothing exports to developed countries be curtailed 
through a quota system. In the Uruguay Round, developed countries agreed to 
progressively phase out their quotas over ten years to January 2005, but they in fact 
retained protection in most sensitive areas up to very near the end of the transition period. 
After liberalization, some additional protections were put in place, which in some cases 
implied a temporary return of the “gray areas” prohibited by the Marrakesh Agreement. 
Agriculture remained the sector subject to both the highest level of tariff 
protection and, in particular, non-tariff protection in industrial countries –and, it could be 
added, this is also true of the developing world (Table 4). In the case of agriculture, and 
despite the 36% reduction in tariffs agreed to in the Uruguay Round, many items of 
interest to developing countries remained high –even prohibitively so— beyond certain 
moderate level of access. Indeed, conscious that the so-called “tariffication” of non-tariff 
restrictions would lead to high levels of tariffs for several products, the Uruguay Round 
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agreement on agriculture set minimum market access commitments, according to which 
the share of imports in domestic consumption for products subject to high import 
restrictions would have to increase in the case of industrial countries at least five percent 
by 2000, at a lower tariff rate than the level of the quota of minimum market access. But 
this made the “tariff rate quota” effectively a quota with the semblance of a tariff. 
Not surprisingly, all estimates of static benefits from liberalization of the trade in 
goods indicate that agriculture concentrates by far the largest benefits. The estimates by 
Anderson et al. (2006), based on a computable general equilibrium model, indicate that 
out of $287 billion of potential static gains from goods trade liberalization, 63% would 
come from agriculture; an additional 14% would come from textiles and clothing. There 
is a copious literature of simulations based on computable general equilibrium models 
with fairly similar results.7 
 The WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture also comprised rules in the areas of export 
subsidies and domestic support. In the first case, subsidies were to be reduced in 2000 by 
36% in value terms and 21% in volume terms vs. the base period (1986-90). In turn, the 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), which includes the trade-distorting subsidies, was 
to be reduced 20% by 2000 for the agricultural sector as a whole. This commitment was 
extremely weak, both because the reference period (1986-88) was that when domestic 
subsidies to agriculture in industrial countries were at a historical peak (see part I) but 
also because of the way subsidies were classified, giving developed countries significant 
room of maneuver to redistribute rather than reduce the level of agricultural subsidies.8 
 The agreement divided subsidies in three categories. The first, which are 
classified under the so-called Amber Box, includes subsidies that are clearly trade 
distorting, as they generate incentives to produce specific commodities or subsidize the 
use of certain inputs. The second, classified under the Blue Box, includes direct payments 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Dimaranan et al, (2003), Hertel and Keeney (2006), and World Bank (2004, ch. 10, and 
2008, ch. 4), and the review of literature of Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), Appendix 1. The latter provide 
also a criticism of this methodology. 
8 See an excellent summary of the Uruguay Round agreement in agriculture in Hoekman and Kostecki 
(2001), ch. 6, and a critical view from the developing country perspective in Das (2003). 
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under production-limiting programs, which include the “compensation payments” of the 
EU and the “deficiency payments” of the US. The third are the very long list of Green 
Box subsidies set in Annex 2 of the agreement, which have to meet the criteria that “have 
no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production”. Only Amber 
Box subsidies are subject to reduction commitments. 
 The Agreement has therefore huge loopholes in the form of subsidies that are not 
subject to reduction commitments: the Green and Blue boxes as well as de minimis 
support for otherwise Amber Box subsidies.9 This has allowed industrial countries to 
redistribute their support to agriculture, while actually increasing the amount of support 
in dollar terms in relation to the reference period in dollar terms (less so when valued in 
euros). This is reflected in Table 5, which summarizes the evolution of agricultural 
subsidies according to the OECD (2008) data. Whereas support based on commodity 
output (Amber Box) has declined, Blue Box (included as part of OECD estimates of 
product support) as well as Green Box subsidies have increased. Interestingly, whereas 
transfers from consumers have declined, as domestic prices paid to producers have 
gradually approach international prices, fiscal transfers have sharply increased. 
Furthermore, although as a proportion of farm gate income, support has declined relative 
to the peak levels of the reference years, they have declined only minimally with respect 
to the levels of the late 1980s. Subsidies are, however, very unequal among different 
countries and commodities. 
World Bank data also indicate that subsidies have not only increased but have 
actually remained higher in relation to the value of production to the levels that were 
characteristic up to the mid-1980s (World Bank, 2008, Figure 4.3 and Table 4.4). In some 
cases, the redistribution has actually broken with even the generous WTO rules. Thus, in 
a dispute settlement case on cotton, it was found that the US had been wrongly shielding 
some trade-distorting subsidies within the Green Box, and was asked to change its 
policies accordingly. 
                                                 
9 The de minimis provision applies for subsidies that represent less than 5% of the value of production of 
the specific commodity involved (10% in the case of developing countries) 
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Table 5
                                                                               OECD: Support to agriculture (US$million)
                                                                                                                                                OECE: Estimat  
1986-88 1989-91 1991-94 1995-97 1998-00 2001-03 2004-06
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) 241,932 249,390 268,866 254,510 257,435 238,555 280,247
   Support based on commodity output 199,357 203,604 207,458 177,979 182,508 154,067 168,322
   Payments based on input use 20,265 22,968 23,745 24,145 21,576 23,055 28,574
Payments based on current A/An/R/I, production required 1/ 18,905 17,759 31,425 41,862 38,886 45,474 42,325
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, prod. required 1/ 533 90 241 459 185 286 732
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, prod. not required 1/ 1,742 1,824 2,598 6,584 12,265 12,571 36,920
   Payments based on non-commodity criteria 920 2,497 3,224 3,270 2,587 3,035 3,699
   Miscellaneous payments 210 647 175 211 -571 67 -324
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) 39,484 53,658 62,650 64,032 55,580 56,761 66,624
   Research and development 3,555 4,242 5,005 5,407 5,187 5,508 6,627
   Agricultural schools 886 988 1,060 1,697 1,694 1,547 1,734
   Inspection services 1,092 1,313 1,451 1,507 1,764 2,048 3,033
   Infrastructure 13,878 17,937 24,143 25,920 20,249 20,111 21,441
   Marketing and promotion 11,895 15,847 22,332 23,992 21,928 22,521 29,261
   Public stockholding 6,561 11,220 5,897 3,192 2,313 2,381 2,064
   Miscellaneous 1,617 2,112 2,761 2,315 2,444 2,645 2,464
Total transfers to producers 281,416 303,049 331,515 318,542 313,014 295,316 346,871
Net transfers to consumers 17,258 19,617 25,343 28,169 25,938 27,555 33,903
Total Support Estimate (TSE)   298,674 322,666 356,858 346,712 338,952 322,871 380,774  
   Transfers from consumers  194,882 193,724 214,244 196,588 192,240 162,106 171,477  
   Transfers from taxpayers 129,856 156,365 178,977 180,439 172,540 182,959 230,651  
   Budget revenues -22,272 -23,293 -33,352 -30,315 -25,829 -22,194 -21,354
Percentage PSE 2/ 37.5% 32.8% 34.2% 29.9% 33.6% 30.6% 28.9%
TSE as % of value of production at farm gate 41.0% 35.6% 37.5% 33.2% 38.1% 34.9% 33.2%
TSE+GSEE as % of value of production at farm gate 47.7% 43.2% 46.2% 41.5% 46.3% 43.2% 41.1%
PSE: Producer Support Estimate. NPC: Nominal Protection Coefficient.
1/ A (Area planted), An (animal numbers), R (receipts), I (Income)
2/ Producer support as proportion of total income (market income plus producer support)
Source:  OECD, PSE/CSE database  
 The debate that has taken place since the Uruguay Round indicates that the 
division between trade and non-trade distorting subsidies is artificial. Blue Box subsidies 
are now clearly recognized as trade distorting. As a result, they have been included for  
reduction commitments in the Doha negotiations. But Green Box subsidies can also 
generate trade distortions. As the World Bank (2007, pp. 97-98) has argued, even 
decoupled payments can influence production by making farmers less averse to risk or 
reducing the variability of farm income and thus making banks more willing to lend to 
farmers. This is particularly true if farmers are potentially credit constrained: in this case, 
reducing the risk they face will allow them to access finance and expand production 
(Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 124). This is particularly so as Green subsidies include 
some income and crop insurance mechanisms. By allowing farmers to obtain parts of 
their income from different sources, even decoupled income support allows them to 
remain in business, which otherwise they might not. 
 Developing countries are affected by subsidies in two ways. First, they have to 
compete with subsidized agricultural goods in their own markets. This problem is 
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particularly critical for those countries that have signed free trade agreement with 
industrial countries. In this regard, even the full elimination of export subsidies, as 
already proposed during the Doha Round of negotiations, may not solve the problem, so 
long as production subsidies equally allow producers to sell below production costs. 
Second, developing countries lose export opportunities in third markets, as the estimates 
of gains in developing countries’ market shares with liberalization indicate. This is 
particularly true of cotton, where world market distortions are essentially generated by 
production subsidies in the US. 
 Trade liberalization of agriculture would have, however, unequal effect on 
different countries. By far the most important gains in terms of additional output would 
accrue to Latin America, and particularly to Brazil and Argentina, followed by Australia 
and New Zealand; the US would also have some gains, which are nonetheless 
insignificant relative to its own production. The most important losses would be those 
experienced by European countries and Japan. However, in the developing world, South 
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa region, the transition economies of Europe and 
Central Asia and most of sub-Saharan Africa would also lose, and some even lose in 
terms of reduced consumption generated by the higher international prices generated by 
reforms (Anderson et al, 2006, Table 6). 
For this reason, agricultural liberalization must be selective, emphasizing in 
particular goods in which developing countries can potentially increase exports and those 
goods that are mainly consumed in industrial countries, whereas major food staples of 
developing countries must be subject to a more gradual liberalization, probably 
redirecting the subsidy budgets in industrial countries to ameliorate the adjustment costs 
in those developing countries which may lose from reforms (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, 
ch. 8). For the same reason, protection mechanisms for agriculture have to be maintained 
in developing countries that are likely to lose from reforms, particularly food importing 
countries, an issue that has been at the center of discussions during the Doha Round (see 
below). 
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In the area of services, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has a 
number of development flexibilities built into its provisions. In the present GATS 
architecture, a developing country can decide whether to enter any service sector in its 
schedules of commitments. Thus, sectors can be excluded. And if a sector is included in 
the schedule, the country can decide the extent of liberalization to commit in that sector, 
in each of the four modes of service delivery, including restrictions and limits on foreign 
equity ownership in Mode 3 on “commercial presence.” 
Negotiations are based on the bilateral request-offer modality. Countries can 
make requests for liberalization in certain sectors. However, it is up to each developing 
country to decide how to respond to these requests. The country can make as much or as 
little in its offers as it deems appropriate to its interests. Furthermore, developing 
countries can  liberalize less than developed countries and to choose their own pace of 
liberalization. 
In practice, however, the freedom that this flexible framework provides could be 
used against developing countries, by pressuring them to adopt commitments in areas that 
are of interest of industrial countries while limiting liberalization in sectors that are 
deemed “sensitive” or in forms of provision that which could be of special interest of 
developing countries (particularly Mode 4, which allows the free mobility of labor). 
Developing countries have been increasing their market share in world exports of 
services to about one-fourth, but this share remains significantly below that for goods (on 
the latter, see Table 3). Developing countries and, particularly, least developed countries 
have used the flexibility that GATS offers, and have made fewer commitments than 
industrial countries, but this is not true of acceding developing countries, which have had 
to accept substantial commitments in this area. Most liberalization has taken place in 
modes 1 (cross-border supply) and 2 (consumption abroad); in contrast, liberalization has 
been more limited under mode 3 (commercial presence) and particularly 4 (movement of 
natural persons) (Marchetti, 2004; World Bank, 2005, pp. 136-8). 
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The WTO data base on service commitments indicates that out of 55 sectors, a 
majority of member countries participate only in eight: hotels and restaurants, travel 
agencies and tour operators, professional services, computer and related services, other 
business services, telecommunications, insurance and banking. Developing countries 
have gained as exporters from those associated with tourism and business services that 
have facilitated offshore supply of certain tasks, whereas liberalization in 
telecommunications and finance, as well as other forms of business services are mainly in 
the interest of industrial countries. 
In Mode 4, commitments have been minimal, and have been made largely to 
facilitate intra-corporate transfers and mobility of executives, managers and specialists 
(Marchetti, 2004, Chart 5). The opportunities for developing countries under Mode 4 are 
potentially very broad, and are closely interconnected with the benefits from partial 
liberalization of temporary migration, or migration in general. Indeed, according to 
general equilibrium estimates, the benefits in this area largely exceed those associated 
with the liberalization of trade in goods. Thus, for example, additional temporary access 
to foreign service providers equal to just 3% of the OECD labor force, would generate 
gains that exceed $150 billion (Brown et al., 2002; World Bank, 2004, ch. 10; Stiglitz and 
Charlton, 2005, Appendix 1). 
In relation to the second set of imbalances faced by developing countries, those 
associated with implementing their own Uruguay Round obligations, the most important 
issue are the constraints imposed on their policy space to implement development-
oriented measures such as promotion of local industries or adoption of new 
technologies. In the WTO’s subsidies agreement, there is a built-in imbalance in that the 
subsidies mostly used by developed countries (for research and development, regional 
development and environmental adaptation) were made non-actionable (immune from 
counter-action) for a period of five years, while subsidies normally used by developing 
countries (for export diversification) came under actionable disciplines, and thus 
potentially subject to countervailing duties. In turn, the TRIMS Agreement prohibits 
developing countries from making use of local-content policy (which developing 
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countries had used to increase the use of local materials and improve linkages to the 
local economy) and some aspects of foreign exchange balancing (export targets aimed at 
correcting balance-of-payments problems). This prevents developing countries from 
taking policy measures which promote domestic industrial development, and which had 
been used by the present industrial countries and by several developing countries 
previously. 
The Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for the 
first time set minimal standards for the whole range of intellectual property. Developing 
countries, which had previously enjoyed the ability to set their own IPR policies, are 
now constrained by having to adhere to IPR standards that are high compared not only 
to what they previously had, but also what the developed countries had when they were 
at their initial stages of industrialization. Prior to the TRIPS agreement, several 
developing countries exempted pharmaceutical drugs and food from patentability, and 
had an active policy of promoting generic medicines. However, this policy of exemption 
can no longer be maintained, as the agreement prohibits exemptions on the basis of 
sectors. The implementation of the TRIPS agreement has therefore increased the costs 
for local firms in developing countries to access technology. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the strict protection of the rights of the innovator, 
there is no comparable protection of the rights of countries over their natural resources 
or traditional communities over their ancestral knowledge. In this sense, TRIPS 
facilitates “biopiracy” or the misappropriation of biological resources and traditional 
knowledge over the use of natural resources originating from developing countries. 
The services agreement has also increased pressures on developing countries to 
open up their services sectors to foreign participation in particular areas of interest of 
industrial countries, such as finance, business services and telecommunications, which 
could result in placing local service providers at a disadvantage vis-à-vis multinationals 
should liberalization proceed too fast. In the traditional area of goods, several 
developing countries have also faced problems from rapid tariff cuts, sometimes the 
result of national decisions to bring tariffs below WTO bound levels, commitments 
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made in free trade agreements with industrial countries and, in many low-income 
counties, conditions placed on financial support from international financial institutions. 
In the industrial sector, many African countries, and most Latin American countries, 
have experienced “de-industrialization”. In turn, as pointed out, in agriculture, 
liberalization has reduced the capacity of developing countries to compete against 
subsidized goods from industrial countries. 
2. The attempt to further broaden the scope of WTO 
Even as the developing countries were trying to digest the Uruguay Round 
outcome, the developed countries launched an initiative to further expand the remit of 
the WTO by attempting to introduce new treaties on four issues –investment rules, trade 
and competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade 
facilitation—into the WTO in the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 
1996. 
The developing countries were opposed to even discussing these issues at the 
Ministerial, but they became the main subjects of a “Green Room” meeting of about 30 
members, that was dominated by the major developed countries. It was eventually 
decided that the four issues would be the subjects of an “educational process”, rather 
than negotiations towards binding rules. 
At the Doha Ministerial meeting in 2001, through the use of unorthodox methods 
(including convening an all-night “Green Room” meeting of some 30 Ministers one day 
after the scheduled end of the conference), a decision was made to deal with the four 
issues in working groups with a view to launching negotiations for new treaties at the 
next ministerial meeting in 2003. This was followed by two years of often acrimonious 
discussions during which it became increasingly clear that the developing countries were 
generally against new treaties inside WTO. Considerable opposition had also built up 
among civil society, with development NGOs combining with trade unions and 
environment groups to urge governments to abandon these issues from the WTO 
agenda. At the Cancun Ministerial meeting in October 2003, many developing countries 
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opposed the launching of negotiations. Eventually the Cancun meeting collapsed on the 
last day without any outcome. In August 2004 the WTO's General Council decided to 
drop three of the Singapore issues (with the exception of trade facilitation) from the 
Doha Work Programme’s agenda.  
The issues of investment, competition and government procurement have a 
similar theme: to expand the rights and access of foreign firms and their products in 
developing countries’ markets, and to curb or prohibit government policies that 
encourage or favor local firms. The proposed investment rules would place governments 
under greater pressure to grant the right of establishment to foreign investors; prohibit or 
otherwise discipline “performance requirements” imposed on investors; allow free 
inflows and outflows of funds; and protect investors’ rights, including through strict 
standards on compensation for “expropriation”. The rules would also grant “national 
treatment” to foreign firms, thus extending this GATT principle (which applies to 
goods) to the whole new domain of investment. 
The proposed rules on competition would require members to establish national 
competition law and policy. Within that framework, it is proposed that the WTO non-
discrimination principles be applied, so that foreign products and firms can compete 
freely in the local market on the basis of “effective equality of opportunity”. Thus, 
policies and practices that give an advantage to local firms and products could be 
prohibited or otherwise disciplined. 
Developed countries have also been advocating for government procurement 
policies (presently exempt from the WTO's multilateral disciplines) to be brought under 
the system, whereby the non-discrimination principles would apply with the effect that 
governments would have to open their procurement business to foreigners and the 
current practice of favoring locals would be curbed or prohibited.  
Many developing countries objected to these new issues. Their concerns include 
that the new obligations would further curtail their development options and prospects,   
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and that these are non-trade issues and bringing them into the WTO would be 
inappropriate and distort and overload the trading system.  
 The developed countries also attempted, before the 1996 WTO Ministerial in 
Singapore, to bring labor standards and environmental standards into WTO. This 
attempt was also strongly resisted by developing countries, which feared they are likely 
to be used as protectionist devices. The argument of proponents of these standards is that 
countries that have low social and environmental standards (or that do not adhere to 
some minimum standards) are practicing “social dumping” or “eco-dumping”, as their 
production costs are said to be artificially low. A countervailing duty should thus be 
placed on the products of these countries as an action against such “dumping.” The 
developing countries fear that they would not be able to meet the standards that could be 
set, due to their lack of financial and technical resources, and would thus be punished. 
They have therefore opposed a linkage between trade rules and these standards. 
These issues figured prominently in 1995-1996, in the early years of the WTO. 
The issue of labor standards became very prominent during the Singapore Ministerial, 
where it became the subject of intense negotiations in the “Green Room” meeting. The 
developing countries succeeded in rejecting the proposals of major developed countries 
to tie the trade rules to adherence to minimum labor standards Before the Seattle 
Ministerial of 1999, the United States tried to revive the issue, but this attempt also 
failed with the collapse of the Seattle conference. 
The issue of environmental standards had been prominent since the mid-1990s. 
One of the key issues was whether countries could take trade measures (such as 
imposing higher import duties) on environmental grounds, by taking account of 
“processes and production methods” (PPMs), or the way in which a product is made, 
when making decisions on the level of duties. Developing countries argued that this 
would be against the rules of GATT, and would also be to their disadvantage as the trade 
measures would discriminate against their products, since they lack the technology and 
finance to adopt more environmentally friendly production processes. Although this 
issue has lain dormant for several years, it has recently re-emerged, as developed 
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country members of the WTO like the US and EU are contemplating the use of tariffs or 
“border tax adjustment” measures as part of their domestic policies to address climate 
change. 
3. The “Development Issues”: Implementation Problems and Special and 
Differential Treatment 
Almost immediately after the establishment of the WTO, the developing 
countries found three types of problems with the implementation of the agreements: 
first, the lack of benefits to developing countries due to the way the developed countries 
were implementing their obligations; secondly, the problems encountered by developing 
countries in having to implement their own obligations; and thirdly, since the SDT 
provisions in various agreements were non-operational and non-binding in nature, they 
were proving to be of little practical use (Raghavan, 2003, p. 7). 
The developing countries first formally raised the implementation issue in the 
Singapore Ministerial of 1996. The 1997 Geneva Ministerial Declaration made a 
lengthier reference to the need for evaluating the implementation of individual 
agreements and the realization of their objectives. From October 1998 to October 1999, 
developing countries tabled papers on the implementation problems, and a group of 
them prepared a list of implementation issues that they wanted resolved. They made the 
negotiations on resolving implementation issues their top priority between the failed 
Seattle Conference to the Doha Conference. They asked for the prior solution to these 
concerns, but the developed countries resisted these calls. 
At the Doha Ministerial meeting, the developing countries finally succeeded in 
placing implementation-related concerns in four areas of the Ministerial Declaration that 
launched the Doha Work Programme. First, a separate Doha Ministerial decision on 
implementation-related issues and concerns was adopted. Secondly, a full section, 
Paragraph 12 of the Doha Declaration, dealt with implementation issues, with an early 
deadline for concluding its negotiation. Thirdly, a list of over a hundred outstanding 
implementation issues was referred to, in a footnote, as the subject of negotiations. 
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Fourthly, SDT was also a part of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. In Paragraph 44 on 
this topic, the Ministers agreed that all SDT provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. It also 
endorsed the work programme on SDT set out in the Decision on Implementation Issues. 
Despite the prominence given to the implementation and SDT issues in the 
Declaration, they were given less and less attention after the Doha Ministerial 
Conference until they have now been marginalized. After the failed Ministerial 
Conference in Cancun in October 2003, implementation issues were put on the back-
burner, and during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005, they 
issues were again pushed into the background.  
According to Narayanan (2008): “No tangible progress has been achieved in 
respect of any issue being dealt with in terms of paragraph 12b of the Doha Declaration 
(on outstanding implementation issues). In brief it can be said that there has been no 
meaningful resolution of even a single implementation issue.” 
On the related issue of strengthening SDT provisions, there has similarly also 
been little progress.10 The Doha Ministerial decided that the work on SDT should: (i) 
make clear recommendations on converting SDT into mandatory provisions; (ii) make 
clear recommendations on how developing countries, especially LDCs, can be assisted 
in making the best use of SDT provisions; and (iii) consider how SDT may be 
incorporated into the architecture of WTO rules.  
Developing countries prepared and submitted several proposals on these three 
matters. By April 2003, the Chair of the General Council proposed an approach to SDT 
in which he compiled 88 agreement-specific proposals. At the Cancun Ministerial in 
October 2003, a list of 28 proposals was compiled for approval, but many developing 
countries maintained that all 88 proposals should be treated as a package. Due to the 
collapse of the Cancun meeting, this set of 28 proposals was also not adopted. At the 
                                                 
10 A good account of the progress (or lack of it) in the negotiations on special and differential treatment and 
other ”development issues” in the Doha Work Programme is in Bonapas Onguglo (2005). 
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Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, there was also little progress, except for a decision 
relating to duty free and quota free market access for LDC products. 
As Onguglo (2005) has pointed out, the development issues have been the most 
difficult to address in the Doha negotiations. The missed deadlines in addressing them 
has disturbed the balance of interests attained in Doha, when developing countries 
agreed to launch a new round as long as their development issues were addressed on a 
priority basis before entering new market access commitments or negotiations on new 
rules. While developing countries have made proposals on SDT and implementation 
issues, “very limited progress forward in terms of concrete, substantive outcomes has 
been achieved” (Onguglo 2005: p. 59).  
III. Market Access Negotiations in the Doha Agenda 
The Doha negotiations started with the promise to “place the needs and interests 
of developing countries at the heart of the Work Programme”11 but, as we have seen, the 
“development issues” of implementation and SDT have been progressively marginalized. 
As the importance of these aspects has dwindled, the market access elements of the Doha 
agenda have claimed centre stage.  
A blow to the proponents of an extreme market access agenda came, of course, 
with the withdrawal of the three main Singapore issues after the incapacity to reach 
agreement in Cancun in 2003. However, the developed countries have made up for that 
loss by aggressively pushing negotiations on NAMA (non agricultural market access) and 
services, without a clear guarantee that they will undertake commitments that 
significantly reduce their agricultural subsidies or open up their markets to developing 
countries. 
An assessment of the market access elements of the Doha negotiations, and the 
major proposals on the table, would show that there is little development content.12 On 
                                                 
11 As stated in Paragraph 2 of the Doha Ministerial declaration. 
12 See for example, Das (2005 and 2008), Khor (2007 and 2008a), Onguglo (2005) and Raghavan (2008).  
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the contrary, there would be few benefits for most developing countries and serious risks 
of further loss of policy space. 
Given the strong frustration generated by the agricultural agreement of the 
Uruguay Round, this issue has been central to the Doha negotiations. The major advance 
has been in the area of export subsidies, where the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial 
conference agreed in 2005 that export subsidies of the developed countries would be 
eliminated by the end of 2013. In contrast, the question of domestic subsidies has been 
the most controversial issue. As we have seen, the major problems of the current 
agreement are the loopholes that allow developed countries to increase their total 
domestic support by shifting from one type of subsidy to others, while maintaining or 
even increasing the total amount of support. 
 The basic framework for establishing the negotiating modalities was agreed to in 
July 2004. The key concept that has emerged is the overall trade-distorting domestic 
support (OTDS), comprising the AMS or amber box, the blue box and the de minimis 
support, but excluding the Green Box. Much of the Doha discussion since then has been 
on the maximum OTDS that the developed countries should be allowed. 
As under the current system, however, this framework would give the EU and US 
considerable leeway to move subsidies around without reducing the total amount of 
support. This is reinforced by the fact that the actual OTDS is far below the level of total 
allowed support for the US and the EU. Therefore, the developed countries can afford to 
reduce the level of allowed OTDS significantly before the cut reaches the level where the 
actual support is affected (Das, 2006; Khor, 2007). In the informal language of WTO 
negotiations, this means that the US and EU would only cut “water” (i.e. the difference 
between allowed and actual subsidies) and not their actual subsidies. This is the reason 
why the EU and US have been able to announce offers to cut their AMS and their total 
allowed OTDS by a seemingly large degree, while in reality these offers do not require 
real cuts in the applied level of support. 
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For example, the December 2008 paper of the Chairman of the agriculture 
negotiations obliges the US to have a bound OTDS of $14.5 billion, which is above the 
$11 billion that the US is estimated to have spent in 2007. Moreover, the developed 
countries can continue to use the Green Box subsidies without limit. As Das (2006) has 
pointed out, the really significant escape route is the Green Box which will continue to 
give farmers large amounts as subsidies. 
On market access, proposals on the table would require developed countries to cut 
tariffs according to a “tiered formula”, but they are allowed the flexibility of more lenient 
cuts for “sensitive products”, thus enabling considerable protection to be maintained. 
Except for LDCs and small and vulnerable economies, developing countries also have to 
cut tariffs by the tiered formula, and up to an average maximum of 36%, which is higher 
than their commitment of 24% in the Uruguay Round. 
Many developing countries, concerned about import surges that will arise from 
further liberalization, have also been fighting to establish two “special and differential 
treatment” elements in market access: “special products” (SPs) and a special safeguard 
mechanism (SSM). The  first proposal implies that developing countries could designate 
a certain percentage of their agricultural products as special products which would be 
subjected to either no tariff reduction or very low rates of tariff reduction. 
On SSM, the developing countries would be allowed a special safeguard which 
does not need to follow the procedures in the WTO’s existing safeguard agreement. 
Under the SSM, action in the form of imposing an additional tariff can be triggered when 
either the price of the import goes below a certain threshold, or the volume of import 
increases above an additional threshold. However, due to the pressures exerted by 
agricultural-exporting countries, the main proposal (in the Chairman’s text of December 
2008) imposes stringent conditions on when the SSM can be used and limited benefits (in 
terms of additional duty) that even if adopted this instrument will not be effective. 
The negotiations and the major proposals on the table have been least 
development-friendly to developing countries in the area of NAMA. If adopted, the 
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August 2004 NAMA Framework would remove or significantly reduce the present 
development flexibilities in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There 
are five problematic features. 
First, members are asked to bind all or most (or at least 95%) of their industrial 
(or non-agricultural) tariffs. This provision would remove the flexibility that countries 
have to choose how many of their tariff lines they want to bind. 
Secondly, unbound tariffs will have to be bound at much lower levels, as the 
applied rates of unbound tariff lines will be multiplied by two and then a formula will be 
used to reduce the tariff rates to the new bound levels. In contrast, up to now, each 
country is allowed to choose at which level to bind their previously unbound tariffs. 
Thirdly, also for the first time, developing countries (except LDCs and others that 
are exempted) will be subjected to a “Swiss formula” to reduce tariffs. According to this 
formula, higher tariffs would be cut more deeply than lower tariffs. Since most 
developing countries have higher industrial tariffs, these tariffs will be cut more steeply 
than those of developed countries. 
The negotiating draft, of December 2008 proposed by the Chair of the NAMA 
group, fixes coefficients for developed and developing countries affected by the formula. 
This proposal implies that the average bound tariff of the major developed countries (EU, 
US, Japan) would be reduced by about 28% while the average tariff of some developing 
countries affected by the formula like India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Venezuela would be 
reduced by about 60%. This would turn the less than full reciprocity principle on its head.  
The majority of NAMA tariff lines for developing countries having to apply the 
formula would be less than 12-14 per cent, which might not be able to support future 
development of local industries. The Chair’s draft also asks developing countries to 
accept two more restrictions. It has an “anti-concentration clause” which is designed to 
prevent developing countries from excluding an entire sector, or close to an entire sector, 
from full formula tariff cuts. 
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Fourthly, the cuts are to be done on a line-by-line basis. This means that every 
product will have to be cut. In the Uruguay Round, the developing countries had to cut 
their tariffs by an overall target of 30%, but they could choose at which rate to cut which 
product’s tariffs, so long as the overall average came to 30%. This flexibility would be 
removed. 
Fifthly, there is a “sectoral approach” in which tariffs will be eliminated in products 
belonging to certain selected sectors. Although participation is supposed to be on a 
voluntary basis, some developed countries, especially the US, have insisted that some 
developing countries (starting with China, India, Brazil) must take part in tariff elimination 
or drastic reductions in three major sectors (chemicals, industrial machinery and 
electronics). This has not been acceptable to the developing countries. 
The implications of the NAMA proposals are serious as their adoption is likely to 
exacerbate the de-industrialization that has already taken place as a result of rapid 
liberalization.13 It must be recalled in this regard that today’s developed countries made 
use of high tariffs to protect their industries during their industrialization phase, and 
successful East Asian economies of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan resorted to tariff 
measures to pursue their industrial development (Chang, 2005; Akyuz 2005, p. 14). 
The ability to use tariffs for industrialization is all the more important since the 
use of other tools has now been constrained by WTO rules, particularly TRIMs and 
subsidies. Also, for many developing countries, customs revenues constitute 20 to 30% or 
more of government revenue. Cutbacks on tariffs could generate, therefore, serious fiscal 
problems. 
In the area of services, it should be recalled that the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) has many flexibilities built into its provisions. These flexibilities 
came under threat in 2005 from developed countries’ proposals for “benchmarking”, 
under which countries would be required to liberalize in a certain minimum number of 
sectors (for example 57% of the service sub-sectors). Other proposals are that developing 
                                                 
13 See in this regard Buffie (2001) and Khor and Yen (2006).  
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countries would be required to bind in the GATS their present level of liberalization in 
the various sectors, and then to extend the level of liberalization through new GATS 
commitments. Particularly targeted was the liberalization of “commercial presence”, or 
Mode 3 of the GATS. In contrast, developed countries themselves have moved very 
slowly, if at all, in the only area where most developing countries could benefit from the 
GATS, which is in Mode 4 on labor mobility. If accepted, these proposed changes would 
affect the present architecture of the GATS and contradict the bottom-up and positive-list 
approach, thereby removing much of its present development flexibilities.  
At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005, the 
“benchmarking” or “numerical targeting” approach was rejected by a large number of 
developing countries, and thus it has been left out of the negotiating agenda, at least for 
now. However the “plurilateral” modality of negotiations –in which a set of countries that 
demand wider and more rapid opening in a service sub-sector can formulate their 
demands and requests to a set of countries for negotiations on these demands—was 
adopted despite the opposition and reservations of many developing countries. 
IV. WTO Governance 
1. Functioning of the WTO Decision-Making System 
The WTO was designed as an institution in which all members are formally equal 
in terms of decision-making rights. This contrasts favorably with the system in the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in which the voting rights of members 
are based on the allocation of quotas, which are skewed in favor of the developed 
countries. This is also reflected in the naming of the Director-General. Whereas the 
process of election of the heads of both IMF and the World Bank lacks transparency and 
has always led to the election of an European and a US citizen, respectively, WTO has a 
more open and competitive system. 
In reality, some developing countries have been unable to realize their 
participation rights because some do not even have a Mission in Geneva. Moreover, 
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many Missions of developing countries are understaffed and thus have been unable to 
adequately follow the discussions and negotiations. Unequal capacity thus leads to 
unequal degrees of participation. 
This problem is made more acute by the relative lack of transparency in some key 
aspects of WTO operations. The main reason for this is its working methods and system of 
decision-making. In practice, as in GATT, a few major industrial countries often negotiate 
and decide among themselves, and embark on an exercise of winning over a selected 
number of more important or influential developing countries in “informal meetings”.  
When agreement is reached among a relatively small group, the decisions are rather easier to 
pass through. The meeting of a limited number of countries to work out an agreement 
among themselves is referred to in WTO jargon as the “Green Room” process.   
In GATT and in the first decade of WTO, the most powerful members by far were 
the so-called “Quad” (comprising the US, EU, Japan and Canada), which had the practice of 
formulating a common position among themselves, and then seeking to influence more and 
more countries around that position, until a “consensus” is said to have been formed. The 
informal “Quad-led system” operated until a few years ago, when it was realized that 
developing countries could not be “rolled over” in the same way as before. In 2004, a new 
informal “Group of 6” emerged in the agriculture negotiations, comprising the US, EU, 
Japan, Australia, Brazil and India. Members of this group negotiated among themselves 
during a mini-Ministerial meeting in July 2004, and again at Ministerial level at various 
stages of the Doha negotiations in 2006 to 2008, while at the mini-Ministerial meeting in 
July 2008, China was included in this small-group negotiation. 
 The inclusion of Brazil, India and now China in this small-group configuration has 
widened the role of developing countries in the “core” of the informal circle of decision-
making, with this “core” functioning at critical moments. However, the reality remains that 
for the majority of developing countries, participation in real decision-making remains out 
of reach. The developing countries in this innermost circle have also made it clear that they 
do not “represent” the developing countries (nor have they been mandated to do so) inside 
the Group of 6 and only carry their own views. 
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The most positive trend in recent years has been the formation of various 
groupings of developing countries which have been actively participating in the debates 
and negotiations. They include the G20, G33, Africa Group, LDC group and ACP group, 
the group of “small and vulnerable economies” and the group of four African cotton 
producers. The participation of these groups in WTO negotiations has built up gradually 
through the years. Nevertheless, as described above, the real fulcrum of decision-making 
power lies not in the democratic and equal exercise of the groupings, but in the small 
grouping of six or seven countries which have undertaken the “real negotiations” at 
critical moments. 
Ever since the WTO was established, the Ministerial Conferences have become 
controversial and unpredictable events. In most of the conferences, several delegations, 
especially those from developing countries, have complained about how they and their 
Ministers have been denied participation in the important meetings where the real decisions 
are taken.  Due to the dissatisfaction of the majority which are kept out, sometimes also due 
to the inability of the minority in the inner circle to agree, and often also due to the methods 
used, which leads to unhappiness and even outrage, these WTO Ministerial meetings are 
usually fraught with uncertainty and have more often than not failed in spectacular fashion. 
In 1999, before the Seattle Ministerial Conference, the Green Room process was put 
into effect by the WTO Director-General. Several small negotiating groups were set up to 
discuss various issues of contention, but most developing countries were not invited to 
participate. At Seattle itself, small negotiating groups were set up to negotiate selected 
topics. Many developing countries were not invited to be in any of the groups. Eventually, 
many developing countries made clear that they would not agree to any Declaration since 
they did not participate in its drafting. The Seattle meeting collapsed at the end, without any 
decision taken. 
In November 2001, the Doha Ministerial conference did end with a Ministerial 
Declaration that launched a “work programme”. However this outcome was achieved 
through a non-transparent process in which the views of a large number of developing 
countries on some of the most important aspects were not reflected in the various drafts 
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of the Ministerial Declaration. This gave rise to perceptions of manipulation and of bias 
of the system towards the major developed countries. 
The most contentious aspect of the Doha process involved the Singapore issues. 
During the preparatory process, a large number of developing countries opposed the 
commencement of “negotiations” on these issues. However, a draft Ministerial 
Declaration that was transmitted to the Doha Ministerial Conference committed the 
members to negotiations on all four issues. Moreover, the least developed countries group 
and several non-LDC African countries had presented views that negotiations should not 
begin on industrial tariffs (or non-agriculture market access) but instead a study process 
be initiated to take account of their concerns that previous industrial tariff cuts had 
resulted in de-industrialization and closure of local firms. Nevertheless, the draft 
committed members to immediate negotiations. 
At Doha many developing countries again stated their opposition to the draft but a 
new draft near the end of the Conference still contained the controversial text on the 
Singapore issues. This caused widespread dissatisfaction and it was clear that there could 
not be a consensus. Then the Conference was extended by an extra day, but many 
Ministers were already leaving or had left. An all-night “Green Room” meeting involving 
about 24 Ministers was convened. On the last morning of the Conference, the secretariat 
released a final draft in which Ministers agreed that negotiations would take place on all 
four issues after the Fifth Ministerial Conference (scheduled in 2003). In a final 
consultation meeting on the same afternoon, more than ten developing countries 
suggested that the text be changed, to remove the commitment to negotiations on the four 
issues. Eventually these countries were asked to accept a compromise, in which at the 
formal closing ceremony the Conference Chairman read out a clarification that in relation 
to the four issues, a decision would indeed need to be taken at the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference by explicit consensus, before negotiations could proceed on the four issues. 
The manner in which the Doha Work Programme was launched, amidst such 
controversial and non-transparent processes, did not augur well for its future course. 
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At the Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003, there was again a controversial 
process. Although many developing countries made clear that they did not want to launch 
negotiations on the Singapore issues, this position was ignored by the “facilitator” 
appointed by the Chair of the conference to formulate a text on these issues. An informal 
“Green Room” of 25-30 Ministers was again convened, while the majority of members 
waited. Eventually, a meeting of Ministers of Africa, LDC and ACP groups conveyed the 
message that they would not agree to a compromise sought at the Green Room on the 
Singapore issues, and a decision was made by the Chair of the Ministerial meeting to end 
the Conference without a decision. This was portrayed as a collapse of the Conference by 
the media. Thus, the decision taken at Doha that this Cancun meeting would launch 
negotiations towards treaties could not be fulfilled and eventually the General Council of 
WTO in August 2004 decided to drop three of the Singapore issues from the Doha 
agenda. 
The Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005 was rather tame by 
comparison. The reason is that major decisions had already been taken at the General 
Council on 1 August 2004, following a “mini-Ministerial” of about 25 Ministers at the 
end of July, held at the WTO building in Geneva (the first time that an event was held at 
WTO). The July mini-Ministerial had generated its own controversies. For example, the 
key decisions in the agriculture modalities framework were made by a meeting of 
Ministers of six members of WTO and then were endorsed by the mini-Ministerial of 
some 30 Ministers. The framework of modalities on NAMA was not properly discussed 
even at the mini-Ministerial. Despite strong objections from many developing countries, 
including through the position taken at a full meeting of African Trade Ministers just a 
fortnight before the Geneva meeting, the key elements of NAMA modalities proposed by 
the Chair of the NAMA negotiating groups remained the same, and these were eventually 
adopted. 
The Hong Kong full Ministerial in December 2005 also had its share of 
contention, as the Chair of the services negotiations also maintained many of the 
elements of his draft on the modalities of negotiations, even though there had been 
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strenuous objections from several developing country members. The most contentious 
aspect was the introduction of “plurilateral negotiations” for several sectors. 
Following the 2005 Ministerial, the WTO failed to hold another full Ministerial in 
2007 or 2008, although there is a mandate to hold a Ministerial every two years. It would 
appear that the Director General and the members were reluctant to hold a formal 
Ministerial conference unless there is a possibility for “negotiations” in terms of making 
decisions on new rules or new market access outcomes. In December 2009, a full 
Ministerial was finally held in Geneva, and it dealt with more routine matters, without 
there being a negotiating component. 
Meanwhile, the “mini-Ministerial”, with 30 or so invited Ministers, and with a 
small group of six or seven Ministers holding their own meeting within this mini-
Ministerial, has become the new practice at WTO. As noted above, this began with the 
July 2004 mini-Ministerial, whose decisions were immediately endorsed by a General 
Council meeting that was convened at the closing of the mini-Ministerial. Since this new 
model of decision-making seemed to have succeeded, the same model was tried again in 
July 2006 and in July 2008. But these two mini-Ministerials ended in failure.   
The above account shows that the processes of decision-making in the 
negotiations have serious flaws. Although there is “formal democracy”, WTO in fact 
operates as an “informal oligarchy”, to borrow Evan’s appropriate characterization 
(Evans, 2003). In this system, representatives of many of developing country groupings 
are invited to some of the Green Room meetings. However, it is still a smaller grouping, 
or groupings, that makes the key decisions, and when agreement is reached among them, 
the other WTO members are expected to follow. There are no formal announcements that 
the meetings would be held, nor formal reports or minutes of the meetings. Neither are 
there reports or minutes of the meetings of the mini-Ministerial meetings, nor of the 
“Green Room meetings” held during the formal Ministerial conferences. 
There are divergent views on whether and how to reform the decision-making 
system in the WTO, which is widely perceived to be non-transparent and non-inclusive. 
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Those who advocate the retention of the status quo may even agree that the system is 
exclusionary but claim that for the sake of “efficiency” in coming up with an outcome, 
the decision-making system has to be confined to a relatively few delegations, while the 
other members not in the inner circle can also make their views heard through their 
representatives in the “Green Room.” On the other hand, those who are critical of the 
non-transparent and non-participatory nature of decision-making argue that the 
exclusionary system and the manipulations that often characterize the operations of 
meetings and production of drafts do not guarantee that an outcome will be obtained, as 
seen by the conferences and mini-Ministerials ending more times in failure and collapses 
than in success. And even in the case of one of the few “successes”, the Doha Conference 
of 2001, the decisions concerning some of the most controversial elements could not be 
sustained and were overthrown by another decision subsequently.    
This indicates that it is essential to make the system more open, democratic and 
inclusive. This implies, foremost, that that the consensus system should be applied in a 
manner that fully respects the views of developing country members –including by 
developing countries not being subjected to economic and political pressure during 
negotiations. WTO practice indicates that this implies that there should be agreed 
procedures for smaller, issue-based meetings, with authorization coming from all 
members and the meetings being governed by transparent rules. It also implies that there 
should be agreed terms of reference for the roles of chairs of formal and informal groups, 
as well as agreed procedures for drafting of texts, which should fairly reflect the 
divergence of views, if any, among members. If “Green Room” or “Mini Ministerials” 
are to be held to speed up negotiations, they should be called by members, who should 
also determine the system of representation. All meetings should be inclusive and 
transparent, minutes should be kept and subject to members’ approval. Finally, the 
neutrality and impartiality of the Secretariat should be observed at all times, and 




2. Surveillance and Dispute Settlement 
 Among the novelties of WTO was the establishment of a surveillance instrument 
and an improved dispute settlement mechanism. The first of these, the Trade Policy 
Review, involves both a document prepared by the WTO Secretariat, reviewing 
developments and the state of trade policy of a country, and a document prepared by the 
country itself. They are presented to the Trade Policy Review Body for peer review 
deliberations. The four largest trading members –the EU, the US, Japan and China—are 
reviewed every two years, the next 16 every four years, and the rest of the members every 
six years or more. 
 The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism is a strengthened version of the one 
previously used in GATT. The new mechanism established a more rigorous process, 
which involves, sequentially and with a strict timetable: (i) a phase of consultations; (ii) if 
it failed to lead to agreement, the convening of a panel; (iii) an eventual appeal to an 
Appellate Body; and (iv) adoption of corrective measures by the party that incurred in 
violations of commitments. As the decisions of the panel and the Appellate Body can 
only be rejected by consensus, they are in practice binding. If corrective measures are not 
adopted, the affected party (or parties) can adopt retaliatory measures. More than half of 
the disputes are settled during consultations and few decisions of panels of the Appellate 
Body have not been complied with and thus led to counter-measures. This is, no doubt, 
the most effective enforcement mechanism of its kind in global economic institutions, but 
there is a consensus on the need to make improvements in certain areas. 14 
Table 6 summarizes the history of the utilization of this mechanism. About two-
fifths of the cases have been complaints among developed countries. However, the WTO 
mechanism has been more actively used by developing countries than the previous GATT 
one. Developing countries also became subject to complaints by other WTO members. 
About one-fifth of the cases have been complaints of developing countries against 
developed countries, and a fairly similar amount has been complaints by developed 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), ch. 3; Das (2003), pp. 61-64, 96-104 and 226-8; 
Srinivasan (2007) and the Sutherland Report, published as WTO (2004), ch. VI. 
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against developing countries. A slightly smaller number have been disputes among 
developing countries. 
Of the nearly 400 cases dealt with in 1995-2008, slightly less than half relate to 
market access issues in the area of goods, with agricultural issues (including fishing) 
being by far the most common. Several of the disputes in this area involved domestic 
taxation rules that are seen by the demanding party as being inconsistent with national 
treatment of imported goods. The second set of complaints –slightly less than a third 
through the history of the mechanism—relate to antidumping provisions, countervailing 
duties and safeguards. More interestingly perhaps, the relative importance of disputes in 
the three areas of contingency protection has increased through time. Export and 
production subsidies come a distant third. The fear that TRIPS could lead to many 
disputes has not been confirmed. TRIMS generated a small number of disputes in the 
1990s but not in the 2000s, whereas a few disputes in the area of services and 
government procurement (among countries who are signatories of the associated 




against:  Developed Developing Total
by: Developed Developing Mixed Developed Developing Mixed
1995 13 7 1 1 3 0 25
1996 15 4 2 12 4 2 39
1997 25 7 0 17 1 0 50
1998 21 5 0 12 3 0 41
1999 18 0 1 6 5 0 30
2000 8 5 1 10 10 0 34
2001 4 5 1 0 13 0 23
2002 17 13 0 2 5 0 37
2003 8 8 0 3 7 0 26
2004 11 3 0 3 2 0 19
2005 2 3 0 3 4 0 12
2006 6 5 0 5 4 0 20
2007 3 4 0 4 2 0 13
2008 3 7 0 6 3 0 19
 
Total 154 76 6  84 66 2 388
39.7% 19.6% 1.5% 21.6% 17.0% 0.5% 100.0%
Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement Database  
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One of the most common criticisms of the mechanism is the fact that the 
retaliatory measures of last resort generate a significant asymmetry between developed 
and developing countries –particularly the weakest among the latter— as the costs of 
measures that they can adopt are unlikely to affect much the developed countries that 
violated WTO rules. In recent negotiations, there have therefore been proposals by 
developing countries to introduce monetary compensation of damages or to allow the 
possibility of tradable remedies or collective action against violators of the rules. 
The costs of using the system are also high, potentially limiting the use of the 
mechanism by poor and small countries. To reduce the costs of using the mechanism, 29 
countries agreed in Seattle to create an Advisory Centre on WTO Law, an independent 
legal aid intergovernmental organization which provides subsidized legal assistance to 
developing countries. 
Equally important are the issue that relates to conflicts regarding the areas of 
competence of institutions of the WTO. In this regard, there have been complaints that 
some jurisprudence of the Appellate Body may have intruded into areas that belong to the 
mandate or competence of some of the political bodies of the WTO, and that in such 
cases the former should refrain from doing so, and instead allow  the political bodies be 
in charge of the issues involved. Equally important, and again to avoid a collision of 
competences, there have been proposals to guarantee a total separation of the Appellate 
Body from the WTO Secretariat.15 
V. The Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements 
 The greatest challenge to the multilateral trading system has come over the past 
two decades not through the complex negotiations taking place in WTO but through the 
proliferation of free trade agreements. This process has ended up eroding more than 
anything the two fundamental principles of the WTO: the general principle of non-
discrimination and its major exception, special and differential treatment. 
                                                 
15 See, on both issues, Das (2003). 
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 GATT and now the WTO allow two exceptions to the MFN principle (there was 
actually a third, preexisting colonial preferences, which is now in the process of being 
dismantled). The first exception is in Article XXIV, which was created to allow for the 
formation of customs unions and the subscription of free trade agreements. The exception 
had two major conditions: that the agreement should involve “substantially all trade” (or, 
in the case of the parallel provision of Article V of GATS, that it should have “substantial 
sector coverage”), and that it should not increase trade barriers for other WTO 
contracting parties. 
 The second exception was non-reciprocity associated to special and preferential 
treatment (SDT) for developing countries, when it was accepted as an essential principle 
of GATT in the 1960s and the 1979 “Enabling Clause”. As in Article XXIV, the 
exception was made on the basis that these preferences should not increase protection 
vis-à-vis third parties. The Enabling Clause also allowed for mutual trade liberalization 
among developing countries without the proviso of Article XXIV that it should involve 
“substantially all trade”, and could thus involve partial scope agreements. 
 Interestingly, there was never any attempt to design specific rules for non-
reciprocal trade agreements between industrial and developing countries. The most 
important were the former colonial (in the case of the US, neocolonial) preferences, 
which were also originally accepted as an exception to the MFN principle in Article I of 
GATT –and thus as a third exception to the general rule. These preferences were 
harmonized and consolidated by the European Economic Community in the 1972 Lomé 
Convention but, as indicated, are now being dismantled. The major reason for this was 
that preferences agreed to in the context of SDT were supposed to be, in principle, 
general preferences for developing countries, as the name of GSP implied, which now 
are understood to include general preferences vis-à-vis least developed countries. A 2003 
Appellate Panel ruling determined, however, that there could be discrimination among 
different beneficiaries of GSP program, so long as a program for a specific group of 
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beneficiaries was available to all developing countries in similar conditions (Hoekman 
and Mavroidis, 2007, ch. 6).16 
The history of customs unions and free trade agreements notified to GATT/WTO 
is summarized in Table 7. Most of the exceptions prior to 1990 were integration 
processes involving several member countries, both in Europe and among developing 
countries. In the developing world, the most active regions were Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Africa, but there were also some agreements in the Middle East (the Gulf 
Cooperation Council), East Asia (ASEAN) and the Pacific. They also include the 1971 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries and the 1988 Global 
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP). Most agreements 
among developing countries were covered by the Enabling Clause and were partial in 
scope. Also, with the exception of the broader frameworks of negotiations among 
developing countries, the agreements were essentially regional in character. 
Table 7
          Active Customs Unions and Free Trade Agreements Announced to GATT/WTO
Early Enabling
pre-1990 1990s 2000s announc. Total Clause
Europe 5 5 9 19
Europe-extraregional 2 7 21 8 38
Ex-USSR 7 21 28
North America-centered 1 3 10 9 23
Intra-LAC 4 1 10 15 3
LA-Asia 8 1 9 1
East Asia and Pacific-centered 5 2 24 12 43 10
South Asia 3 3 3
Western Asia 1  1 1
Turkey-centered 11 11 1
Africa 5 2  7 5
Interegional developing 3 1  4 3
 
Total 26 28 117 30 201  
Using Enabling Clause 12 7 8 27
Source: Authors' estimates based on WTO database. Excludes accessions, enlargements and
extension of agreements into new areas (generally services). In the case of Europe, includes
agreements with Faroe Islands.  
                                                 
16 The ruling related to special benefits given to Pakistan as part of special program for developing 
countries involved in combating drug production and trafficking. The decision of the Appellate Body 
implied that it was consistent with WTO rules if similar trade preferences were given to other developing 
countries that were combating drug trafficking. It overruled the panel decision that GSP had to be made 
available to all developing countries without differentiation. 
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These initial exceptions made sense from the point of view of the emerging trade 
order and thus as exceptions to the general MFN principle, as they involved “deep 
integration” processes, in which a region became the unit of trade that negotiated with the 
rest of the world (with the EU being the most remarkable example), and the promotion of 
South-South trade through the “Enabling Clause”. However, the agreements that came 
later ended up destroying the two fundamental principles of such a multilateral order. The 
new trend had some precedents in the 1980s (such as the 1985 United States Israel Free 
Trade Area and the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, which was 
superseded by the 1993 NAFTA) but took off in the 1990s and let to a veritable 
proliferation of free trade agreements over the past decade. As Table 7 indicates, of the 
2001 agreements notified or announced by April 2009 (eliminating double counting17), 
three-fourths were signed in the 2000s. They generally include goods and service, but 
also intellectual property provisions and the “Singapore issues” as well as labor and 
environmental standards. The enabling clause continues to be also a framework for some 
deals among developing countries, particularly those of partial scope. 
These agreements came in waves and increasingly went beyond their regional 
character to cover interregional agreements. This is a reason why the concept of “regional 
trade agreements” (RTAs) and “regionalism” commonly used to refer to them is 
increasingly inappropriate. The term “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs), increasingly 
used to refer to them, is also inappropriate, as it does not differentiate those preferences 
that are associated with Article XXIV and those that derive from SDT. 
 The major clusters that are identified in Table 7 indicate that the largest number of 
these agreements center in Europe and increasingly involve deals between the EU or 
EFTA and extra-regional partners. The Americas are also very active early on, both the 
United States and Canada as well as some Latin American countries –Chile and Mexico, 
in particular—and in all cases involve an increasing number of interregional agreements. 
To this we must add the agreements among Latin American countries that are done in the 
                                                 
17 The number of agreements is actually larger, 228 excluding accessions, but there is some double 
counting associated with the expansion of existing agreements which were already notified. 
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context of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), which is in fact a flexible 
framework for partial or full scope agreements among its members. The former members 
of the USSR also became active in the late 1990s, essentially replacing the old trade 
arrangements of the Soviet era with free trade agreements among themselves, with 
Ukraine being the most active country and also involved in FTAs with other regions 
(such as countries that made up former Yugoslavia). 
In the 2000s, the East Asian region became the most dynamic region in the 
subscription of FTAs, again led by a few countries, particularly Singapore and, 
increasingly, Japan. Turkey also became an active member of the FTA club over the past 
decade. Outside Latin America and East Asia, other developing country regions were 
much less active, particularly South and Western Asia (with the exception of Turkey). In 
Africa, the old integration agreements of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s remained the 
essential frameworks for intraregional trade. Some of these countries have also been 
involved in negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU, with 
great reluctance in several cases. 
 Viewed as a whole, the process has been uneven across the world. The EU, 
EFTA, three industrial countries (Canada, Japan and the US), four developing countries 
(Chile, Mexico, Turkey and Singapore) and a transition economy (Ukraine) have been 
most active in these negotiations. The unevenness of the process is also true within some 
regions. In Latin America, for example, the activism of Chile and Mexico is in sharp 
contrast with the reluctance of Argentina and Brazil to enter into this race. 
 The consequence of this trend for the MFN principle was ably summarized in the 
report on the “Future of WTO” led by Peter Sutherland: “MFN is no longer the rule; it is 
almost the exception (…) Certainly the term might now be better defined as LFN, Least-
Favoured-Nation Treatment” (WTO, 2004, p. 19). The “spaghetti” or “noodle” bowl of 
rules that this implies is extremely problematic, not only in relation to tariffs but also 
non-tariff rules and, particularly, rules of origin. Indeed, managing the complexity of 
rules has become an additional trade restriction. Even if, on balance, trade creation rather 
than trade diversion has prevailed, the basic idea that was embedded in the reconstruction 
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of a multilateral trading system in the post-war years is now essentially moribund. We are 
essentially back to the complexity of bilateral rules that characterized the 1930s, 
curiously for the opposite reason: competitive liberalization rather than competitive 
protectionism. The attempt to be ahead of others to access markets –which can be 
properly called “beggar-thy-neighbor” liberalization— may in the end be largely futile if 
others follow in the competitive race and sign FTAs to avoid being displaced from those 
markets. Curiously enough, the major way to block this process, by not accepting their 
compatibility with multilateralism through a rejection of these agreements in WTO, has 
been totally dysfunctional, as there is an implicit agreement not to step on each other’s 
toes. 
 Equally problematic is the fact that the very uneven negotiating power between 
developed and developing countries in these deals has brought into the agreements the 
non-trade issues that developing countries have refused to negotiate in the WTO.18 As 
Bhagwati (2008, pp. 70-71) has concluded: “Because of the spaghetti bowl, and because 
hegemonic powers use PTAs to impose a host of expensive trade-unrelated demands on 
the poor country partners in PTS, that reflect lobbying demands in the hegemon, PTAs 
are a particularly unattractive trade option for the poor countries relative to 
multilateralism”.19 
 Equally problematic is the fact that these agreements have also dealt a hard, even 
a death blow to SDT. The reason is that, although the agreements may include some 
provisions that allow a more gradual liberalization of trade or broader exceptions for 
rules for developing countries, the double condition of liberalization of “substantially all 
trade” (“substantial sector coverage” in services) and reciprocity imply that only very 
weak forms of SDT can be incorporated into the agreements. Given the greater fiscal 
capacity that industrial countries have to use the subsidy schemes that are allowed by 
these arrangements, SDT may actually be turned upside down, with the special treatment 
enjoyed by the developed and not developing countries. Particularly, in the area of 
                                                 
18 See Khor (2008b) for a critique of North-South FTAs, especially the implications of the non-trade issues 
in these FTAs. 
19 See a broader analysis of this issue in Bhagwati (1991 and 2008) and WTO (2004, p. 23, paragraph 87). 
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agriculture, developing countries may end up competing with subsidized goods from 
industrial countries, without having the possibility of protecting .their own local goods. 
Similarly, under the FTAs, the developing countries’ higher technology infant industries 
are given no protection and must compete with the science and technology subsidies of 
industrial countries. 
Furthermore, the excessive expansion of these agreements into non-trade areas 
constrains the policy space that developing countries have to a much larger extent than 
WTO rules do. The ongoing debates on the EPAs of developing countries with the EU 
reflect this fact, as the debate on FTAs of the US with Latin American has done for 
several years. In fact, the experiences of the FTA that has been applied for a longer time 
period, NAFTA, indicates that it helps to generate foreign investment and export growth, 
but it does not necessarily help accelerate economic growth (see, for example the analysis 
on Mexico by UNCTAD, 2007). 
The new rules represent also a challenge for the promotion of South-South trade, 
as envisioned in the Enabling Clause which permits developing countries to promote such 
trade by given each other preferences that are not extended to industrial countries. 
Indeed, to the extent that FTAs include a MFN clause among contracting parties, South-
South agreements signed by any of its developing country parties of the FTA would have 
to be extended to the industrial country partners of the FTA. So, for example, given the 
rules of the EPA signed between the EU and the Caribbean countries, preferences 
extended by Brazil to the Caribbean countries would be automatically extended to the 
EU. This fact by itself reduces the room for South-South trade negotiations.  
 Crucial in this regard is, of course, the fact that the negotiating capacity that 
developing countries have in WTO, and which has been more actively used in recent 
years, is entirely lost in the wave of FTAs. Indeed, industrial countries have forced into 
these agreements issues and provisions that developing countries have refused to 
negotiate in WTO. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
  The multilateral trading system is in an unsatisfactory condition and some critics 
describe it as being in a crisis. To its credit, it has established a stable legal framework 
that accompanied a substantial growth of international trade and a significant though very 
uneven diversification of exports in the developing countries. Despite the formal 
democratic character of WTO, its decision making process in WTO has several flaws. 
The Doha Work Programme launched in 2001 is now in an impasse. It had pledged to put 
the interests of the developing countries at the centre of the Programme but the developed 
countries have whittled away the development elements and instead placed market access 
issues at the center of the negotiations. Although developing countries have been able to 
use their negotiating power to block some unfavorable deals, they have not been able to 
advance their interests in the WTO. 
Despite their many attempts to correct the inadequacies of the system, there has 
been only very limited advance on the issues of agriculture, tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation that developing countries have put on the table since the 1960s, or on more 
recent  issues, such as the Mode 4 liberalization in services. The Uruguay Round added 
an additional series of imbalances, including the inclusion in the WTO of a non-trade 
issue, intellectual property rights, and there have been additional pressures since then to 
include further non-trade issues, the so-called Singapore issues. Following the 
establishment of the WTO, the developing countries made a great though so far 
unsuccessful effort to have the WTO membership re-examine the rules and to re-balance 
the system in the initiative known as “implementation issues” as well as to strengthen 
SDT. The Doha Round was born as an uneasy North-South compromise, but as the 
negotiations developed, the “development aspects” disappeared and it has become almost 
a pure market-access Round. 
 It is thus time to undertake a fundamental review of the international trading order 
that has emerged in recent decades and to re-think what a better order would be like in 
the future. A major part of such a review would have to include a deep consideration of 
what has happened to the two basic principles that were formulated in the post-war 
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period: non-discrimination (and, particularly, the Most-Favored Nation principle) and  
Special and Differential Treatment, two principles for which the bells are now tolling. 
The second principle is, of course, an exception to the first, but it is an appropriate one, as 
it recognizes that the world economy is still a highly unlevel playing field, and that equal 
rules for unequal players and circumstances will worsen inequalities. 
Thus the present impasse in the Doha Round should provide the opportunity for 
initiating reforms to the international trade architecture.  Such a reform should include the 
following:  
1. Standstill on FTAs until clear rules can be agreed on how to reestablish the 
primacy of global over bilateral or plurilateral rules. 
2. A review of the existing WTO rules with the view to orient them to be in line with 
development principles. This would take into account the emerging consensus 
that for developing countries trade liberalization is neither an end nor a goal in 
itself, but has to be calibrated to align with their industrial, growth and 
employment policies. 
3. The review should include whether it is appropriate for existing non-trade issues 
(especially intellectual property) to be included in the mandate and legal 
framework of the GATT/WTO system. There should be a standstill for further 
introduction of new non-trade issues such as investment, competition policy, labor 
standards, environment standards, into the WTO. Criteria should be developed on 
the issues for which it is appropriate to apply the principles of the WTO-GATT 
system, before further initiatives to inject such new issues. 
4. A proper process to consider the “implementation issues” and the proposals to 
strengthen SDT provisions, as well as to establish a “SDT architecture” as 
envisaged in the Doha Declaration). 
5. Review the rules in agriculture to ensure that there will be really substantial 
reduction or elimination of domestic support in developed countries, and not 
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merely a shifting between types of subsidies, and ensure the promotion of 
developing countries’ food security and farmers’ livelihoods through an effective 
special safeguard mechanism. 
6. Align the trade rules to the industrial development needs of developing countries 
by ensuring sufficient policy space for the growth of existing and new industries. 
Consideration of what types of development policies are essential to build 
production (or supply) capacities in the development world, and what 
international transfers of resources and technology are essential to support, in 
particular, the development of such capacities in least developed countries. 
7. Measures and institutional mechanisms to address the commodity issues, 
including instability of commodity prices, fluctuations in demand, processing and 
diversification. 
8. Advance in Mode 4 of service liberalization, where very limited advance has been 
made. 
Another major aspect of reconsidering the international trade architecture is the 
allocation of roles and mandates to different organizations. It is a mistake to identify the 
WTO as the multilateral trading system. It a treaty-based organization that deals with 
certain aspects of trade as well as certain non-trade issues. There are other aspects of 
trade that the WTO’s rules do not cover and that the WTO is not equipped to deal with, 
such as boosting the production capacity of developing countries so that they can engage 
better in trade, or addressing the wide range of commodity issues. The roles of other 
organizations should be remembered and strengthened as part of the reform process. For 
example, the commodities issue is best dealt with by UNCTAD, and intellectual property 
issues by WIPO, CBD and FAO, while improving the production capacity of developing 
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